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The fact that the draft budget may become a bone of contention is not new for Ukraine. The adoption of
the country's key financial document seems to be traditionally behind the schedule, the notorious
example of that being the half-year budget marathon of 1997 with the 1997 budget being approved only
on June 27, 1997 by almost the minimum number of votes: 229. The 1999 budget was approved on the
New Year's eve, late at night on December 31, 1998. The 2000 budget was also late: the state finally
received it in mid-February 2000.
The current political process in Ukraine has been largely influenced by the "budget fever" that is in the
epicenter of the parliament's and the government's lives and risks to draw the branches of power into a
vicious circle of new tension. The budget dispute, based on two main claims - "the budget is unrealistic
and, therefore, should not be approved in this form" and "the budget is unrealistic for it is impossible to
receive the planned revenues from privatization" is becoming increasingly politicized.
The Process
The draft budget-2001 arrived to the parliamentary committees on October 4, 2000, and consultations
and bargaining between MPs and the government have continued practically non-stop since then.
Although it is likely that - as head of the Parliamentary Special Commission for Privatization
Oleksandr Ryabchenko believes - "this budget will still be voted for before January 1 - or even before
December" (Den, October 20, 2000), the probability that the targeted budget revenue from privatization
is the key issue that may delay the adoption procedure. The draft law "On the State Budget of Ukraine
for 2001" plans that as much as UAH 9.2 billion (US$ 1.5 billion) will be received from privatization.
Possibly, the expected figure reflects Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko's expressed belief that the
government nowadays "feels sufficient demand for the Ukrainian privatization" (Interfax-Ukraina,
January 17, 2000). Currently the government takes much effort to convince the international
community and, particularly, Ukrainian MPs whose support will be critical for adopting the budget,
that the planned revenue is realistic. Meanwhile, Ukrainian law-makers tend to be rather skeptical
about the possibility, and many of them tend to agree with parliamentary majority coordinator
Oleksandr Karpov that the budget cannot be built "on a virtual scheme from the very beginning,
conceptually" and that there is no guarantee that "the revenues will actually take place" (UT-1, UTN-
Panorama, October 13, 2000). Many MPs, from the left wing of the political spectrum as well as from
the center and the right think that probably only one-third of the planned amount will also be reached;
many MPs also doubt that the revenues, even if received, will be spent on enterprise development and
financing of poverty reduction programs.
Yet, some politicians are optimistic about the privatization prospects. For instance, Oleksiy Kostusev,
MP, believes that the government's estimates for the UAH 9.2 billion privatization revenue in 2001is
quite realistic (Den, October 18, 2000). According to chairman of the parliament's Budget Committee,
member of Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna party Oleksandr Turchynov, the only thing that may
hinder the adoption of the 2001 budget in the first reading is "some political positions of certain
factions, aimed not only against concrete proposals but against the government". Hence, the delay in
the budget process may have a visible impact on the political appearance of the parliamentary majority
and single out its "pro-government" part, notwithstanding the numerous statements of the parliament's
leadership that the unity of the majority cannot be challenged by anything.
Another point of controversy is the fact that the inclusion of the privatization revenues to the budget
runs counter the IMF's recommendations. Unlike the Ukrainian government, the IMF does not see the
privatization money as a prime source of budget revenue for in most countries of the world (some
Ukrainian politicians prefer to add "civilized world") the privatization money is used for development
and enterprise modernization and restructuring i9nstead of mending all sorts of public consumption
"holes". In Ukraine's case, the latter looks likely to be the case, notwithstanding the government's "ten
steps" announced by Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko as designed to ensure the fulfillment of the
2001 budget and transforming it into "the budget of development", for which as much as over UAH 3
billion would be channeled to the economic sector and the privatization money would not be "eaten up"
(Ukraina Moloda, October 6, 2000).
Rather symptomatically, head of the State Property Fund of Ukraine Oleksandr Bondar admitted that
the UAH 9 billion revenue, planned to be received from privatization, was a surprise for him and he
was not sure that he would be able "to report successfully about fulfilling that plan" (Studio 1+1, TSN,
October 17, 2000).
The law-makers' doubts about reality of the "virtual" draft budget were materialized in their decision to
postpone the voting on the document in the first reading from October 19 to November 2. The
parliament motivated the decision by the arrival of too many (about 6 thousand) comments and
proposed amendments to the draft. The decision was preceded by the joint conference of the
parliamentary majority factions with President Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko
on October 18, 2000. Commenting on the meeting and its result, President Kuchma noted that he "did
not give the task to convince members of the parliament to adopt the budget today". He described the
meeting as a "frank talk" and stressed that the inflation rate included in the draft budget and the "mis-
coordination" of the issue of relations between the national and local budgets "did not suit" him (Den,
October 20, 2000).
However, postponing the voting date does not guarantee that the key financial document will be
approved on time. The problem is not limited to the opposition of the left-wing part of the Ukrainian
parliament. According to member of the Communist faction Georgy Kriuchkov, communists do not
support the draft budget "on principle", for it has been formed "obviously not on a real basis". The
claim is followed with traditional complains like "robbing the people even further" and "ongoing
colonization of Ukraine"(Inter, Podrobnosti, October 17, 2000). After all, it is not unusual that left-
wingers oppose privatization; the point is that the ranks of "left-wingers" tend to grow when voting on
critical issues is at stake.
Problems of planning based on "recorded" achievements
While the current draft budget is zero-deficit, as demanded by the Budget Resolution adopted by the
Ukrainian parliament in June 2000, a number of MPs are rather skeptical of accuracy of the "zero-
deficit" claim because they think the privatization revenue task is too ambitious. For instance, leader of
Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv Oleksandr Volkov argues that "we believe the budget contains built-in budget
deficit, namely those 9 billion hryvnyas" (Inter, Podrobnosti, October 17, 2000). According to the
President's top economic adviser and chairman of the Supervisory Board of the National Bank of
Ukraine Anatoly Halchynsky, the expectation to receive UAH 9 billion from privatization in 2001 are
not convincing and even "artificial": "This figure is specified in the three-year privatization program
that was approved by the Verkhovna Rada. Then everybody applauded. Now the government is taking
measures to receive the UAH 2.5 billion planned for the current year (Vechirniy Kyiv, October 17,
2000). According to the Law "On the State Program of Privatization for 2001-2002, signed by the
president on June 15, 2000, the amount of the budget revenues from privatization is expected to be
equivalent to US$ 1.5 billion and US$ 1 billion, respectively. According to the 2000 budget, the
revenue from privatization is to total US$ 500 million in 2000 (Interfax-Ukraina, June 15, 2000).
Rather symptomatic data were quoted during the presentation of the formal report of the State Property
Fund on October 17, 2000. According to the Ministry of Finance, since the beginning of this year the
revenue from privatization has totaled UAH 1,283 million, while the initial plan from the ten months
was to receive UAH 2,266 million (Den, October 18, 2000). In 1999, the revenue from privatization
(less the money transferred by regional branches of the State Property Fund) totaled UAH 694 million
against the UAH 800 million that had been initially planned. In 1998 the actual revenue from
privatization was UAH 360 million, far less than the planned amount of UAH 1,040 million.
Hence, the repeated failure to meet the expected privatization objectives gives little reason to hope that
the revenue part of the next year's budget will be fulfilled. This consideration - apart from publicly
voiced doubts that appear to be based on something more substantial than just mere unwillingness to
privatize attractive objects - has been offered as an explanation for the MPs' demands to reduce the
target revenue from privatization by UAH 2.2 billion. On October 18, 2000, Victor Yushchenko stated
that "when the draft state budget is upgraded <...> its revenue part will not be reviewed." On the same
day Minister of Finance Igor Mitiukov announced that "... the Minfin [i.e., the Ministry of Finance] has
been authorized to consider how realistic the revenue of UAH 9.2 billion from privatization is <...>
Only the funds the receipt of which is guaranteed should be kept in the revenue part of the budget,
while the rest should be kept out of it and channeled <...> for servicing the state debt." One week later,
on October 25, Valery Asadchev, MP, announced that "... the government and the parliament reached
preliminary agreement on reducing the figure of privatization revenue in the draft state budget <...> by
UAH 2.2 billion." However, no official announcement of such an agreement has been made.
Privatize or Give Away?
These days the issue of privatization has been accompanied with at least two rather massive PR
campaigns. On the one hand, the government takes every effort to demonstrate that any doubts about its
ability to receive the necessary amount to the budget as revenue from privatization are groundless. The
process of looking for potential investors interested in taking part in privatization of seven of Ukraine's
regional electricity distribution companies, oblenergo, is gaining increasing publicity. Privatization of
the oblenergo is one of the IMF's conditions for de-freezing its loan-making facility for Ukraine, and of
the EBRD for providing loans for completing reactors of the Rivne and the Khmelnytsky nuclear
power plants, which itself serves as a strong motivation for the pursuit of the "energy privatization".
Currently the second wave of privatization of oblenergo is gaining momentum, after the State Property
Fund suspended sales of shares of nine oblenergos at the stock exchange and within the independent
stock market in December 1999. The process was resumed shortly, in early 2000, but under new
conditions including, primarily, transparency and search for "strategic" potential buyers.
On October 12, 2000, the government's session approved conditions of privatization of seven Ukrainian
oblenergos, setting the minimum price for the seven lots of shares at US$ 132 million, but actually
planning to receive much more: about US$ 250 million. All of the oblenergos are supposed to be
privatized together with their debts to the budget that currently total almost UAH 1 billion. New
owners of the oblenergo are supposed to pay the debts within five years and can expect special
beneficial arrangements for the initial two years.
On October 20 Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko personally advertised the oblenergos to potential
Western investors. His negotiations with the leadership of the Silk Road (USA) were attended by
representatives of the Credit Swiss First Boston, the official advisor to the Ukrainian State Property
Fund (SPF) in the matter of privatization of the seven oblenergos. According to SPF head Oleksandr
Bondar, the Prime Minister's "road show" could be described as a success, as two major Western
companies, Electricite de France and the American AES Silk Road confirmed their interest to bid.
Conditions of privatization of the first group of oblenergos - the Kyivoblenergo, the
Zhytomyroblenergo and the Rivneoblenergo - were published on October 25. The sale is expected to
bring over US$ 100 million. The start prices have been established at US$ 32 million for the
Kyivoblenergo, US$ 18 million for the Rivneoblenergo and US$ 16.5 million for the
Zhytomyroblenergo. According to Oleksandr Bazarov of the Credit Suisse First Boston, the
privatization effort can be regarded a success on several conditions: if at least four companies are sold,
if the privatization is fair and transparent, if the one to offer the highest price actually becomes the
winner (DINAU, October 25, 2000). Currently the list of potential investors lists almost 40 companies
prepared to bid.
This step, made by the cabinet of Ministers, may be regarded as a "trump card" used to impress the
parliamentary majority before the draft budget debates, as the successful adoption of the budget may
have a significant impact on this Cabinet's future. Yet, the successful privatization is necessary for
something far more significant than security of some jobs in the government or the future of the
oblenergos: the failure to meet the privatization revenue target specified in the draft budget may plant a
time mine under the country's general social-economic status, no matter what exactly will be
underfunded as a result, the traditionally cash-strapped social security programs or the state debt.
The second, equally dynamic PR campaign is remarkably symptomatic in this context, for it is aimed at
convincing everybody that it is impossible to receive UAH 9 billion from privatization next year. One
can add: impossible, if the proposal of not-so-attractive property is accompanied with not-so-attractive
conditions. The efforts taken to convince the general public and potential buyers that Ukraine does not
have any top-rate property to privatize and that whatever is offered for privatization is not worth much
look irrational not only from the perspective of the need to receive as much money to the budget as
possible, but also from the point of common sense, and raise suspicion that the seller - in this case,
bureaucrats who act on behalf of the Ukrainian state - simply wish to reduce the price. The question
"why" sounds rhetorical in this context: one may just remember the rapid reduction in the price of the
Ukrainian telecommunications monopoly, Ukrtelecom.
Obviously, as regional electricity distribution monopolies, oblenergos will always be attractive pieces
of property. However, there is a number of objects that are far more attractive and that could well be
sold for more than the notorious UAH 9 billion. Yet, they may find themselves under the new
ownership in a while: quietly, without too much public attention, through non-monetary methods and
netting for past debts. These objects include strategically important pipeline systems, pipe-making
plants, oil refineries, aluminum and nickel plants, granite quarries. Political and economic aspects of
their property change is a matter of a separate research - particularly given the interest of one of
Ukraine's "strategic partners" that simultaneously happens to be its most demanding creditor which
may, with the little help of its local lobbyists, leave Ukraine no choice as to whether to privatize to or
give away.
Any alternatives? Questions without answers
Obviously, it will be impossible to fulfil the budget without the due revenue from privatization.
Notwithstanding all efforts taken by the Ukrainian taxation authorities to increase the level of tax
collection (even though that many real business taxpayers simply cease to exist afterwards, and,
naturally, pay no more taxes), the revenue from taxation can only be increased after the large
privatization attracts massive investment and after the general business activity grows. For instance,
business activity can be stimulated - and, therefore, budget revenue increased - by opening road
concessions and developing the road infrastructure and the system of transit transportation routes.
However, even under the best-case scenario it is impossible to expect the return at once.
Apart from privatization and taxes, the budget revenue could include dividends that the state - still the
biggest property owner in Ukraine - could earn on its shares. So far the real figures in this field remain
a closely guarded secret. Remarkably, the dramatically low level of dividends has caused no reaction of
the government. Notwithstanding the widespread belief that state-owned enterprises give no dividends
because they do not work effectively, the real reason may be different: their top managers have no
motivation to show dividends because they bear no responsibility for ineffective management and the
resulting losses.
Another unanswered question is why, given the persistent shortage of budget revenues, the state
privatizes so little and so slowly, and shows remarkably little interest in making its own property work
effectively and bring dividends. The exulted debates about the "unrealistically high" amount of UAH 9
billion (about US$ 1.5 billion) demonstrate the real problem of Ukrainian privatization, as the figure
appears to be high only if compared to the modest achievement of the previous years. Yet, the debates
suggest another option: in fact there is no intention to accelerate the pursuit of the large privatization,
lose control of, and sell attractive pieces of property, search for the notorious "effective owner" and
"industrial investor", and demand real dividends on the state-owned shares. The dilemma may confirm
the claim that " the state" is not effective "in general", but effective are the individuals in the
governance system who pursue their own interests.
Another issue that seems to need a logical answer is why little action is taken and few changes are
made notwithstanding the repeated failure to meet the privatization tasks and criticism of the
privatization process. The answer, almost classic, is "because someone needs it that way". The key
problem of privatization Ukrainian style is the substitution of the critical element - the transfer of
property rights and the arrival of an owner that would manage his/her property effectively and develop
it - with the nomination of individuals that only pretend they have the property rights.
Unless the State Property Fund and other state agencies are brought to the condition that would be
adequate to the large privatization task, start active preparation of the objects to be privatized, search
for potential investors and introduce transparent competition procedures, until the property rights cease
being a potential matter of revision, unless the category of face-figure "owners" backed by "higher"
interest groups for re-distribution of public resources is minimized, it will be difficult to expect serious
income from privatization, and even more difficult to expect successful market transformation.
